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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERV- ) 
ANCY DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
( 
I 
vs. ) 
( 
]. BERT NELSON and MYRTLE G. \ 
NELSON, et al., } 
Defendants and Appellants. , 
Case No. 
9256 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of the enlargement of the Pineview 
Reservoir by respondent and the taking necessitated thereby 
of 10.3 acres of land from the appellants' farm. For some 25 
years prior to the enlargement of the reservoir, appellants had 
operated a dairy farm located near Huntsville, Utah. Their 
farm consisted of 79 acres of land which appellants own and, 
as indicated by the conflicting evidence of the various wit-
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nesses, between 2 and 7 acres of usable reservoir lands the 
use of which appellants obtained by a now expired 20-year 
lease of some 70 acres of land occupied by the original Pineview 
Reservoir (R. 104, 110, 170). All of these 70 acres of reservoir 
lands were inundated by water except the buffer areas lying 
above the high water mark and below the condemned area 
(R. 168) . In addition, the appellants pastured their dry stock 
on a lease basis on lands owned by a neighbor (R. 41, 48). 
Eight acres of the area condemned and the usable reservoir 
lands served as the pasture for appellants' dairy cows on the 
date in question. The remainder of the farm was level, irrigated 
land suitable for growing a variety of crops, including the 
principal crops of hay and grain needed to sustain the dairy 
livestock. This crop land area lay to the east of the condemned 
area on a rather level ((bench" some 20 feet higher in elevation 
than the existing reservoir water level. 
Located at the east end of the farm were various farm 
buildings, including a house, hay barn, milking parlor, live-
stock shed, potato cellar and machine shed. These buildings 
were arranged, used as, and met the requirements of a Grade 
UA" dairy operation, producing market milk for human con-
sumption (R. 20-21). 
The 10.3 acres of land acquired by the respondent is 
situated on the western end of the farm and includes all of 
the natural pasture on appellants' farm. It also has located 
on it a spring \vhich is the only live source of \Vater on appel-
lants' property for the dairy animals, except the culinary water 
supplied to the residence and farm buildings. The culinary 
water supply, during the winter months, sometimes proved to 
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be unreliable and inadequate for the usage demanded by 
appellants' herd of dairy animals (R. 31). 
In the acquisition of the 10.3 acres of land, respondent 
takes the spring and deprives appellants of any access to it 
(R. 29), thereby leaving appellants, as they view it, without 
a suitable place to water their livestock (R. 31). ·Prior to the 
enlargement of the reservoir, appellants maintained a dairy 
herd of approximately 25 milking cows and 20 dry stock (R. 
21-22). With their pasture lands and spring taken away, it 
became impossible to carry on a dairy operation. It is conceded 
by both parties that the farm, as it now is, is not suitable for 
a dairy operation, and that the buildings peculiar! y suited 
to the dairy opertaion have lost much, or all, of their value 
(R. 3 3, 34, 36, 62-66, 136-138). Respondent attributes this 
more to the loss of the leased lands than the loss of the land 
acquired by it (R. 138). However, appellants testified that 
if the 10.3 acres and the spring had not been taken from them, 
they would have been able to continue a 2 5-cow dairy operation 
on the land they owned by feeding additional supplemental 
feeds or by converting 5 acres of land to planted pasture and 
reducing the number of dry stock ( R. 61, 114-115) . 
Upon motion of the respondent, the issue of the value of 
appellants' 10.3 acres of land and the damage to appellants' 
remaining property was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories as follows (R. 205) : 
uwe the jury impanelled in the above entitled cause 
make awards as follows: 
1. Just con1pensation for property taken: 
A. Value of the 10.3 acres taken, to-
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gether with spring water on lands 
taken -----------------------------------···-···---------· $3,0 50.00 
2. Just compensation for severance damage 
to property not taken -------------------------- 1,847.00 
Total just compensation awarded________ 4,897 .00" 
The interrogatories appear to be signed and read as 
follows: 
'' 1. What was the reasonable fair market 
value of the defendants' total property 
as of March 24, 1957 (the day before 
the taking of the 10.3 acres, assuming 
a purchaser and seller both did not 
know it was to be taken?) 
Answer --------------------------------------------$51,600. 00'' 
There are eight signatures. All jurors signed. 
'' 2. What was the reasonable fair market 
value of the defendants' total property 
as of March 26, 1959 (the day after the 
taking of the 10.3 acres, assuming a 
purchaser and seller both knew the 
said property was taken?) 
Answer ------------------------------------------------$46,20 3 .00'' 
There are seven signatures. 
"3. What v:as the highest and best reason-
able use of the property in question as 
a purchaser and seller would consider 
it before the taking of the said 10.3 
acres? (Please v1rite brief description.) 
The description written: "Crop farm 
with a very limited number of live-
stock." 
Signed by all eight jurors. 
1{4. What was the highest and best reason-
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able use of the property in question as a 
purchaser and seller would consider it 
after the taking of the said 10.3 acres? 
(Please write brief description.) 
The brief description written: nCrop farm." 
Appellants, by timely motions, attempted to obtain a new 
trial, or in the alternative, a modification of the verdict to 
correspond with the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGA-
TORIES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER AND 
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH TI-IE GENERAL VERDICT. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING RESPOND-
ENT'S WITNESS WARNICK TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT 
CONCERNING ANIMAL CARRYING CAPACITY OF AP-
PELLANTS' LANDS. 
III. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND PREJUDICIAL-
LY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO DAMAGES TO 
APPELLANTS' (<DAIRY BUSINESS." 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGA-
TORIES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER AND 
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL VERDICT. 
This matter is governed by the provisions of Rule 49 (b), 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein it is stated as follows: 
(((b) General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to 
Interrogatories . ... When the answers are consistent 
with each other but one or more is inconsistent with 
the general verdict, the court may direct the entry of 
judgment in accordance with the answers, notwith-
standing the general verdict or may return the jury for 
further consideration of its answers and verdict or may 
order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent 
with each other and one or more is likewise incon-
sistent with the general verdict, the court shall not 
direct the entry of judgment but may return the jury 
for further consideration of its answers and verdict 
or may order a new trial." 
It is the position of appellants that the answers to the 
interrogatories are inconsistent with each other and that one 
or more of them are also inconsistent with the general verdict, 
and that a new trial should be granted. However, it is possible 
to reconcile the inconsistent answers in such a manner as to 
provide a verdict which could be justified under the evidence, 
as will be explained later. 
The verdict of the jury on June 12, 1958, awarded appel-
lants damages as follows: 
10.3 acres condemned --------------------------------------$3,050.00 
Severance damages --------------------------------------------$1,847.00 
Total --------------------------------------------------------$4,897.00 
In the answers to the interrogatories the jury stated that 
the fair market value of the farm before condemnation was 
$51,600.00, and the fair market value after the taking was 
$46,203.10. The difference of $5,396.90, whereas the jury'~ 
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total award was $4,897.00, clearly constitutes an inconsistencj 
of the type contemplated by Rule 49 (b), and shows that the 
jury made no attempt to follow the measure of damages rule 
set out by the court in Instruction No. 9 (R. 194): 
tc 1. You shall determine in dollars the fair market 
value of the entire farm of the defendants, includ-
ing the improvements, as of March 25, 1957. 
2. You shall then determine the fair market value as 
of the same date of the farm of the defendants, 
including the improvements, after the taking of the 
said 10.3 acres of land. 
3. The difference represents the total just compensa-
tion to be awarded to the defendants. 
From the foregoing difference you shall then deduct 
the fair market value of the 10.3 acres of land taken. 
The remainder, if any, is the amount of severance 
damages to be awarded." 
An analysis of the answers also will point out that they are 
clearly inconsistent with each other. The answer to special 
interrogatory number 1 stating that the fair market value of the 
property was $51,600.00 before the taking is the exact figure 
given by Mr. Werner Kiepe in his testimony (R. 135). The 
jury could not have possibly arrived at that figure by any other 
means. The answer to special interrogatory number 2 of 
$46,203.10 as being the fair market value of the property 
after the taking is the precise figure given by Mr. Story as 
his value of the properties after the taking (R. 55). The jury 
could not have arrived at that precise figure by any means other 
than accepting Mr. Story's figure, particularly since Mr. Kiepe's 
«(after" value was $48,050.0Q-a higher amount (R.136) . 
An analysis of the two foregoing figures, together with 
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the testimony of Mr. Kiepe and Mr. Story, points out the serious 
inconsistency in accepting those two figures. The discrepancy 
appears in the values placed upon the properties, both before 
and after the taking, by the two appraisers. For instance: 
Value of Farm Buildings Per Kiepe: 
Lounging shed 
(Before and After Value) ----------------------$2,000.00 
Hay barn, milk barn and milk house 
(Before and After Value) ----------------------$1,100.00 
TotaL------------·----------------------------------$ 3, 100.00 
V altte of Farm Buildings Per Story After Taking: 
Lounging shed --------------------------------------------$1,152.00 
Milk house ----------------------------------------------------
Milk barn ----------------------- ________ ---------------------
Hay barn ------------------------------------------------------$2,960.10 
T otaL _______________________________________________ $4, 112.10 
It is quite obvious from the foregoing that the amounts 
arrived at by the jury as their answers to special interrogatories 
1 and 2 show appellants' farm buildings as having more value 
after the taking than before. The figure given by Mr. Story as 
the after value of the farm exceeds Mr. Kiepe' s value after 
and before the condemnation by $1,012.10. This inconsistency 
would penalize the Nelsons unnecessarily and points out the 
folly of the jury's answer. 
In addition to the foregoing inconsistency, the testimony 
of Mr. Story was that the entire group of farm buildings, in-
cluding the residence and the buildings not listed above, had an 
after value of $18,603.10. Mr. Kiepe placed a before and after 
value of $16,000.00 on those buildings, making an additional 
variance of $1,591.00 (R. 62-66, 136). 
10 
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The only possible consistent approach which could be made in 
the form of entering a verdict in this case would be as follows: 
Base difference between $51,600.00, less 
$46,20 3.10 ---------------------------------------------------- $5' 396.90 
Inconsistency in answers between after 
values of Story and Kiepe relative to build-
ings used for milking purposes ------------------ $1,012.10 
Inconsistency on remaining farm buildings 
and residence per analysis of before and 
after figures of Story and Kiepe__________________ $1,591.00 
TotaL ______ ------------------------------------ _________ $8, 000.00 
It would be a travesty on justice to permit the figure of 
$51,600.00 as the before value of the property set out by Mr. 
Kiepe to stand against the after value of $46,203.10 given by 
Mr. Story when in fact the after value given by Mr. Story con-
tains appraisal figures on certain farm buildings which con-
siderably exceed the before or after value placed upon them 
by Mr. Kiepe! 
There do not seem to be any cases under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure or the corresponding Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that would be of much assistance to the court, par-
ticularly since matters of this type must necessarily depend 
upon the peculiar factual situation of each case. 
In 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 1082, it is stated: 
n • • • if findings are made which are contradictory 
as to material facts, such facts are left undetermined, 
and since it is not the province of the court, unless by 
consent, to determine them, no judgment can be ren· 
dered." 
11 
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In 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, Sec. 139, it is further stated: 
c c • • • Likewise, where findings which constitute 
the foundation of a general verdict appear to be un· 
justified, a new trial will be ordered." 
Support for the foregoing statement is also found in a 
case note found at 56 A.L.R. 2d 1251: 
\CA new trial should be ordered where the general 
verdict is in plaintiffs favor, and the special findings 
of the jury, which are supported by the evidence, are 
inconsistent with one another, or consistent with one 
another but inconsistent with the general finding, 
though not destructive of the plaintiff's right of re-
covery.'' 
Under the evidence the special interrogatories are clearly 
inconsistent with each other, and the same are inconsistent 
with the general verdict rendered in the matter. Accordingly: 
although the special interrogatories can be reconciled for an 
$8,000.00 verdict by stretching their construction, appellants 
submit that the only real course which the lower court had 
available was to grant a new trial. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING RESPOND-
ENT'S WITNESS WARNICK TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT 
CONCERNING ANIMAL CARRYING CAPACITY OF AP-
PELLANTS' LANDS. 
In attempting to qualify Francis M. Warnick as an 
expert witness to testify as to the carrying capacity of the 10.3 
12 
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acres of land taken from appellants, the respondent was able 
to show only that Mr. \Varnick was raised as a boy on a farm 
in Millard County, Utah; that it was an all-purpose farm having 
some livestock and devoted principally to the raising of alfalfa 
and grains; that the farm did not have any pasture land on 
it; and that since becoming a civil engineer, and particularly 
since 1942, Mr. Warnick had done work in planning irrigation 
developments and analyzing the economic effect of such de-
velopments upon farm lands (R. 165-166). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Warnick admitted that, in fact, 
he had never made an investigation of appellants' 10.3 acres 
to determine its productivity or carrying capacity. This is amply 
clear from the following testimony: 
tcQ. What were you doing when you went into that red 
area to examine it? 
A. The specific times that I have gone in there I have 
either been supervising survey groups who have 
been taking topogs of the area or visiting the areas 
specifically to identify general vegetative cover or 
to identify erosion problems. 
Q. In other words you have never really gone into that 
area to make a study as such of the carrying capa-
city of livestock on it, have you? 
A. No, I only know this from having identified the 
vegetative cover throughout the reservoir area and 
having some experience with valuation of carrying 
capacity of various kinds of pasture. 
Q. Am I correct in this that the analysis you made 
of the carrying capacity was really a by-product 
or a side-line to the real purpose you were there ? 
A. That's correct." (R. 174-175). 
13 
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In spite of this obvious lack of knowledge and experience 
concerning the pasturing of livestock, the witness was per-
mitted to testify that in the 7 or 8 acres of the usable land 
obtained by appellants under the reservoir lease, the appellants 
could pasture 12 animals (R. 173) but that in approximately 
8.3 acres of the land ta-ken from the appellants they could only 
pasture 2 or 3 animals (R. 172) ! The witness knew nothing 
about appellants' practice with respect to the pasturing of their 
animals and he did not even know how many animals they 
had been maintaining on their farm (R. 173-174). 
Certainly, the testimony on this subject comes within the 
requirement that the witness answering the questions have 
specialized knowledge or experience to qualify him as an expert 
and permit his opinion to be received by the jury. The rule 
suggested in Section 5 59 of 2 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edi-
tion, is that-
UNo special experience shall be required unless the 
matter to be testified to is one upon which it would 
clearly be presumptuous, under the circumstances of 
the case, for a person of only ordinary experience to 
assume to trust his senses, for the purpose of his own 
action in the ordinary serious affairs of life." 
This rule, if applied to the subject matter of the testimony 
offered in this case, would clearly indicate that this is a subject 
upon which the ordinary individual would seek the advice 
of an experienced person if he were making a decision which 
depended upon the accurate determination of such a fact. 
It is stated in 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 783, that-
UTa be competent to testify as an expert witness, one 
must have acquired such special knowledge of the 
14 
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subject matter about which he is to testify, either by 
study of the recognized authorities or by practical ex-
perience, that he can give the jury assistance and guid-
ance in solving a problem which the jury are not able 
to solve because their knowledge is inadequate." 
The possession of the required qualifications by a particular 
witness must be expressly shown by the party offering the 
witness ( 2 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 560). Also, 
((When a witness is offered as an expert upon a 
matter in issue, his competency, with respect to special 
skill or experience, is to be determined by the court as 
a question preliminary to the admission of his testimony. 
There should be a finding by the court, in the absence 
of an admission or a waiver by the adverse party, that 
the witness is qualified; and since there is no presump-
tion that a witness is competent to give an opinion, it 
is incumbent upon the party offering the witness to 
show that the latter possesses the necessary learning, 
know ledge, skill, or practical experience to enable him 
to give opinion testimony." (20 Am. Jur., Evidence, 
Sec. 786). (Italics added). 
Although the respondent failed to show that this particular 
witness was qualified either by study or by any recent experience 
or that he had even made an inspection of the property in 
question for the purpose of determining its carrying capacity, 
the court, when it ruled on appellants' objection to the wit-
ness's qualifications, in effect ignored its responsibility to 
either find the witness qualified or to exclude his testimony. 
This is amply shown by the testimony beginning at the bottom 
of Page 169 of the Record: 
tcQ. Now, based on your experience both as a civil 
engineer and on the farm, I' 11 ask you whether you 
15 
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have an opinion as to the carrying capacity of the 
area in green ? 
A. I do. 
Q. And what is your opinion? 
MR. FULLER: Now, we raise an objection at this 
point. There is no proper foundation shown for this 
witness to show the carrying capacity of livestock 
on this area. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The jury 
may give his opinion such weight as you think it 
is entitled." 
Appellants submit that it is not for the jury to determine 
the degree to which a witness is qualified or unqualified to 
give an expert opinion. It is first for the court to rule on the 
qualifications and then, if the expert is qualified, the jury 
may consider his opinion, the reasons given for it and weigh 
such opinion with the other evidence in the case. The court 
in this case in effect told the jury: 
''You judge the witness. If you think he is qualified 
as an expert you may accept his testimony; if you think 
he is not qualified as an expert you may disregard his 
testimony.'' 
This results in extre1ne prejudice to the appellants for two 
reasons: 
1. It implies to the jury that the witness is qualified 
and that they shall give weight to his testimony. 
2. One of the crucial issues in this case was whether 
or not the appellants' farm could be operated as a 
dairy farm with the 10.3 acres of land condemned, 
but \vithout the lease of the original reservoir lands. 
16 
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The jury's answer to special interrogatory number 3 to 
the effect that the highest and best use of the farm before 
the taking was ·'crop farm with very limited number of live-
stock" leaves no doubt but that the testimony of Mr. Warnick 
on the subject of the carrying capacity of the 10.3 acres of 
land was accepted by the jury. It should further be noted that 
respondent requested the special interrogatories to be given 
the jury and that Warnick's testimony was undoubtedly planned 
in advance to support the answer to interrogatory number 3 
which respondent hoped to elicit from the jury. This was the 
only cases in the series tried wherein special interrogatories 
of this type were submitted to the jury. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND PREJUDICIAL-
LY INSTRUCTED 1'HE JURY AS TO DAMAGES TO 
APPELLANTS' ctDAIRY BUSINESS." 
The court instructed the jury (R. 195): 
"No. 12. 
You are instructed that for the purpose of determining 
the amount of just compensation to be awarded to the 
defendants, there is a distinction between damage to 
lands and improvements not taken, vlhich result from 
the taking of a part of the defendants' property, and 
damage to the ~~dairy business'' heretofore conducted 
by the defendants on their lands. Damage to the lands 
and improvements not taken constitutes severance 
damage for which compensation may be awarded, but 
no compensation can be awarded for damage to or 
17 
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destruction of a ndairy business" regardless of who 
conducted it on the land. Severance damages are 
awarded only for loss of temarket value" which could 
be expected in a sale. Therefore loss in ((market value" 
is to be compensated for and may be reflected in part 
in the adaptability of the land and improvements for 
profitable use, but other losses to a profitable business 
is not compensatable." 
The appellants excepted to the giving of instruction num-
ber 12, as follows (R. 203) : 
nException is taken to instruction number 12 and to 
the whole thereof for the reason that there is no evi-
dence in this case submitted by the defendants or by 
the plaintiffs relating to the value of the properties as 
a ((dairy business," as the term is intended to mean in 
the instruction, that in no case has there been any evi-
dence offered relating to profits of the business or even 
to the productivity of the dairy business and that the 
giving of the instruction tends to mislead the jury 
relative to any severance damages that might be award-
ed for the .remaining buildings on the property of the 
defendants." 
Respondent also objected to the instruction (R. 202), 
thereby providing unanimous concurrence as to its impropriety: 
((Plaintiff excepts to instruction number 12 and par-
ticularly to the last two sentences thereof which refer 
to market value but fail to specify market value. Be-
cause of its failure to specify the property that market 
value refers to, the instruction is confusing and preju-
dical to the plaintiff." 
Viewed in the light of the evidence presented to the jury, 
the instruction draws an unwarranted, unnecessary and im-
proper distinction between the dan1age which results to appel-
18 
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lants' rematntng lands and improvements as a result of the 
taking of the 10.3 acres and damage to ((dairy business." It is, 
of course, true that a property owner is not entitled to be 
compensated in a case of this sort for any loss of future profiits 
or reduction in future business. It is the contention of appel-
lants, however, that by wording the instruction as it did, the 
court conveyed to the jury an impression that they were not 
to award appellants any sum of money to compensate fo; 
the reduction in value of the farm buildings that were used 
in the dairy operation. 
Throughout the instructions given to the jury, the court 
repeatedly indicated that damages could be awarded for a 
reduction in value to ' (remaining lands and improvements.'' 
Then, in instruction number 12, the court removes from the 
consideration of the jury and from the broad definition of 
((lands and improvements'; what it chose to call ((the dairy 
business." Since there was absolutely no testimony introduced 
or claim made on the part of either appellants or respondents 
concerning any alleged value or depreciation in value of appel-
lants' ((business," loss of future profits or any claim for com-
pensation to cover such items, a reasonable jury could logically 
conclude that the phrase ((dairy business" referred to the dairy 
buildings. There was no evidence to indicate that it could mean 
anything else, and in attempting to follow the court's distinction 
between "lands and improvements not taken" and ((dairy busi-
ness" the jury, based on the evidence introduced at the trial, 
\vould have to conclude that the dairy buildings as a group 
constituted an item which could not be included in their award 
of damages. 
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The rule applicable to this situation is set out in 3 Am. 
Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1124: 
((The test of reversible error is whether or not the 
jury was misled so that they reached a different result 
than they would have reached but for the error, or 
whether there is a serious misdirection in the charge 
excluding from the consideration of the jury an issue 
properly in the case, or whether the instruction prob-
ably prejudically affected the substantial rights of the 
complaining party .... Instructions which tend to mis-
lead the jury or which could have any influence thereon 
are ordinarily grounds for reversal." (Italics added.) 
In view of the fact that there was no evidence concerning 
the value of a ((dairy business' or of a claim for loss of profits 
or any other item related thereto, the attempt of the court to 
inject a distinction between ((dairy business" and the damage 
to the remaining lands and improvements was totally uncalled 
for and certainly misled the jury to such a degree that they 
reached a result contrary to the result which would have been 
reached had the instruction not been given. The inadequacy 
of the severance award contained in the verdict clearly suggests 
that the jury did not consider the damages to appellants' dairy 
buildings. 
By their answer to special interrogatory number 4, the 
jury indicated that the remaining properties could be used only 
as a crop farm. Implied in this answer is the conclusion that 
the dairy buildings were severely reduced in value. In light 
of this, the inadequate severance award supports the appellants' 
contention that the jury was misled by instruction number 12 
and that one of the rna jor issues of this case was thereby re-
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moved from the jury's consideration, resulting in substantial 
prejudice to the appellants and justifying a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants submit that the verdict and judgment entered 
in this matter should be reversed and set aside and a new trial 
ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
SCOTT D. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Appellanti~ .... 
15 East Fourth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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